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Constitutional barriers to congressional reform
mericans celebrate our Constitution as a beacon that can
guide us through difficult situations. And justly so. But at times, the
Constitution also has stood as a barrier to necessary reform.
Take, for example, the mess that is
Congress. Bipartisanship and regular
order· are things of the past. A senator
or representative's willingness to
work with someone across the aisle
can trigger a career-ending primary
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challenge. Highly irnpactful health
care and tax bills have been written
in secret and rushed to votes without
public hearings or, seemingly, regard
for public opinion. Congressmen have
used tax dollars to settle sexual harassment charges.
Little wonder, then, that
Congress's approval rating stood at
13 percent in November, according to
Gallup. Moreover, 2017 will mark the
eighth straight year in which

Congress's average annual approval
rating has fallen below 20 percent.
What has caused Congress to become ever more dysfunctional in recent years? It is difficult to say, but
many blame the astonishing surge of
money in politics and the increased
sophistication of partisan gerrymandering. The former tends to render
Congress more beholden to special
interests than to the collective interSEE GREASE D3

Sometimes, there are Constitutional barriers to congressional reform
stand on principle and to buck
the donor class. Term limits
est. The latter tends to proalso would ensure that
mote partisanship and deter
Congress would more fremembers of Congress from
quently be refreshed with new
engaging in compromise.
members.
So what can be done? UnBy the mid-1990s, 23 states
fortunately for those unhappy had enacted laws placing
with the status quo, a divided term limits on members of
Supreme Court has interCongress. But in US Term
preted the Constitution to
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
(1995), the Supreme Court
place significant constraints
split 5-4 to hold that states
on some of the more obvious
pathways to reform: term lim- cannot impose qualifications
its, campaign-finance regula- for service in Congress (intions and restrictions on parti- cluding term limits) beyond
san gerrymandering.
those specified in the Consti1. Term limits. Advocates tution.
for term limits - restrictions
The court concluded that
on the number of terms sena- allowing additional regulation
tors and representatives can
would work an unconstituserve - argue that they could tional transfer of sovereign
help to "drain the swamp."
power from the people - who
Term limits would ensure
may elect their preferred congressional candidates subject
that, at any given time,
Congress would be staffed by only to constitutional citizena number of members who
ship, age and residency recannot run for re-election and quirements - to the states.
therefore would not be preoc2. Campaign-finance regcupied with raising money for ulations. Federal and state
their next campaign. Morelegislation has sought to reover, members who know they duce the impact of money in
are leaving might feel freer to politics. Provisions have been
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enacted regulating, among
other things, campaign expenditures, campaign contributions, corporate and union
support for campaigns, and
the timing and veracity of political advertisements. Measures also have been taken to
encourage the public financing of elections and to require
public disclosure of the
sources of certain political
spending.
In a series of decisions, the
Supreme Court has struck
down many campaign-finance
regulations as inconsistent
with the First Amendment's
free-speech guarantee. In arguably the most important of
these rulings, Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission (2010), the court acknowledged that legislatures
may enact campaign finance
regulations to combat "corruption" without violating the
First Amendment.
But dividing 5-4, the court
narrowly defined corruption
in terms of a quid pro quo that is, a direct exchange of
donor dollars for a specific

legislative vote - and held that
"ingratiation and access ... are
not corruption." As a consequence, the court understands the First Amendment
to protect the influence-peddling that is so pervasive and,
many would say, corrosive to
the public interest.
3. Limits on partisan gerrymandering. Partisan gerrymandering - the practice of
redrawing of voting district
lines by state legislatures to
entrench the political majority
after each census - has made
most congressional districts
politically monolithic. Representatives serving such districts are incentivized to place
party over country and become vulnerable to their extreme flank if they are seen as
insufficiently partisan. In such
an environment, compromise
becomes next to impossible.
Some states have sought to
reduce partisan gerrymandering by creating bipartisan
redistricting commissions.
And two years ago, in Arizona
State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Districting

Commission (2015), the
Supreme Court split 5-4 to uphold the constitutionality of
such commissions. In doing
so, the court rejected the argument that the Constitution
assigns the task of redistricting to state legislatures alone.
Moreover, the court
presently has under advisement two cases that raise the
question whether court-ordered limits on partisan gerrymandering might be constitutionally permissible in some
circumstances.
But no court order striking
down a partisan gerrymander
has ever been permitted to
stand. So, while reformers
concerned with the issue have
a bit more reason for hope
than those who favor term
limits or greater campaign-finance regulation, the battle
remains uphill.
In a famous dissenting
opinion handed down in 1932,
Justice Louis Brandeis argued that the Supreme Court
should not lightly interpret
the Constitution to prohibit
legislative responses to

crises.
He wrote: "It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory,
and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country."
Justice Brandeis was admonishing his fellow justices
to permit the states to try out
policies designed to counteract the effects of the Great
Depression.
But his point can be generalized to apply to efforts by
Congress to reform itself as
well. And it is a point that the
Supreme Court might well reflect upon as it watches our
national institutions take on
water.
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